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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Carpenter v. United States,2 the Supreme Court held that law 
enforcement officials may no longer retrieve the cell-site location 
information from cell network carriers without first obtaining a warrant.3  
The Court ruled that collection of this information was protected by the 
 
 1   J.D. Candidate, 2020, Seton Hall University School of Law. B.A. 2017, George 
Washington University. Thank you to all of those who encouraged me to keep thinking, 
learning, and advocating for what I believe in. My family, my teachers and professors, my 
friends and fellow law students, and the faculty at the law school have all been instrumental 
in my growth as an aspiring attorney. I hope to one day impart the same wisdom onto those 
after me. 
 2   Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 3   Id. at 2221.   
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Fourth Amendment due to the sensitive nature of location tracking.4  Prior 
to Carpenter, prosecutors could acquire location information from carriers 
without a warrant because courts found that suspects had voluntarily given 
the information to their cellular network carrier, thereby depriving the 
location information of its subjective privacy interest.5  In the realm of 
genetic information and its use in criminal investigations, law enforcement 
officials can use DNA in a variety of ways and may acquire it covertly, 
consensually, by force, or from family members.6  Because there is no 
privacy interest in abandoned property or voluntarily revealed information, 
law enforcement officials have circumvented privacy interests in genetic 
data by claiming that a person who exposes their DNA to a company or 
website that collects and analyzes DNA (such as Ancestry.com or 23&Me) 
has somehow undermined their privacy interest in their own genetic 
information.7 
While Carpenter concerned the government’s acquisition of cell-site 
location services, its rationale regarding the government’s general 
acquisition practices can also apply to the acquisition and use of DNA 
information.  This rationale could call for future regulatory legislation to 
require a warrant to acquire and use a suspect’s genetic information.  This 
comment will show that genetic information deserves special protection due 
to its sensitive and immutable nature, and that new regulations should be 
promulgated to effectively protect the citizenry from a “too permeating 
police surveillance.”8  Part II will analyze all of the ways in which police 
currently use genetic information and under what circumstances genetic 
information is protected.  Part III will examine the implications of exposing 
an individual’s genetic information, and the interest in keeping that 
information private and protected.  Part IV will look to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Carpenter to determine how to effectively regulate law 
enforcement’s acquisition and use of DNA in solving crimes. 
 
 4   See id. at 2221–22. 
 5   See id. at 2216. 
 6   See Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected 
Issues, 76 WASH. L. REV. 413 (2001). 
 7   See Gina Kolata & Heather Murphy, The Golden State Killer Is Tracked Through a 
Thicket of DNA, and Experts Shudder, N.Y. TIMES (April 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/27/health/dna-privacy-golden-state-killer-
genealogy.html.   
 8   Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2231. 
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II. HOW LAW ENFORCEMENT UTILIZES DNA 
A. What Justifies Police Collection of an Arrestee’s Genetic 
Information? 
In 2013, the Supreme Court decided Maryland v. King,9 and granted 
law enforcement across the nation the ability to save the DNA of arrestees—
arrested wrongly or otherwise—to the Combined DNA Index System 
(CODIS), where it can be used to identify suspects in past crimes, future 
crimes, or cold cases.10  In DNA testing, the coding regions are known as 
genes and contain the information necessary for a cell to make proteins, but 
non-protein-coding regions are not related directly to making proteins and 
have been referred to as “junk DNA.”11  The Supreme Court stated that “junk 
DNA” contains no “far reaching and complex characteristics like genetic 
traits.”12 
In Maryland v. King, Alonzo King was arrested for first and second 
degree assault and was compelled by police officers to participate in a 
“buccal swab” of the inside of his cheeks.13  At the time, under the Maryland 
DNA Collection Act, a DNA sample must have directly related to “the 
identification of individuals” involved in the crime, and an officer was not 
permitted to “perform a search of the statewide DNA database for the 
purpose of identification of an offender in connection with a crime for which 
the offender may be a biological relative.”14  In the context of Fourth 
Amendment protection, the Court held that “a buccal swab on the inner 
tissues of a person’s cheek in order to obtain DNA samples is a search.”15  
But the Fourth Amendment’s proper function is to defend against “intrusions 
which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an 
improper manner.”16  The “ultimate measure” of the constitutionality of a 
governmental search is reasonableness, and the Court found the “buccal 
 
 9   569 U.S. 435 (2013). 
 10   Id. at 441. 
 11   Id. at 442. 
 12   Id. at 442-43. 
 13   Id. at 440 (“As part of a routine booking procedure for serious offenses, his DNA 
sample was taken by applying a cotton swab or filter paper . . . to the inside of his cheeks.”). 
 14   Id. at 444 (emphasis added) (citing Md. Code Ann. Pub. Safety § 2-506(d)). 
 15   King, 569 U.S. at 446 (“The Court has applied the Fourth Amendment to police efforts 
to draw blood, scraping an arrestee’s fingernails to obtain trace evidence and even to a 
breathalyzer test.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 16   Id. at 447 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966)) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
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swab . . . falls within this category.”17  But even if a warrant is not required, 
a search “must be reasonable in its scope and manner of execution,” and the 
Court balanced the “privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns 
to determine if the intrusion [was] reasonable.”18 
The government in King argued that it had an interest in collecting 
arrestees’ DNA to (1) identify the arrestee, (2) guarantee the safety of police 
officers, (3) ensure the persons accused are available for trials, (4) know an 
individual’s past conduct and accurately determine bail, and (5) aid in crime 
solving and possibly free persons wrongly imprisoned.19  The Court then 
weighed these interests against the privacy-related interests of DNA 
collection by examining technology’s evolution and use in solving crimes, 
while making reference to other means of identification such as 
“photographing and fingerprinting.”20  The Court acknowledged that “DNA 
identification is an advanced technique superior to finger-printing in many 
ways” but the Court stated “[t]he additional intrusion upon the arrestee’s 
privacy is not significant,” so it gave great weight both to the significant 
government interest at stake in the identification of arrestees, and to the 
unmatched potential of DNA identification to serve that interest.21 
The Court in King explained that the arrestee’s privacy-related interest 
is “a minimal one.”22 The reasonableness of any search “must be considered 
in the context of the person’s legitimate expectations of privacy,” and the 
Court noted “the expectations of privacy of an individual taken into police 
custody ‘necessarily [are] of a diminished scope.’”23  The Court 
distinguished the diminished privacy interests of arrestees and the search at 
issue in the case from “the sort of programmatic searches of . . . the public at 
large,” which might have a heightened expectation of privacy.24  But, in the 
absence of individualized suspicion, the Court has insisted on the search 
having “some purpose other than to detect ordinary criminal wrongdoing” to 
justify the search as necessary.25  The Court held that individualized 
suspicion was not categorically required for King because of his “diminished 
expectations of privacy” and because the intrusion was “minimal.”26  The 
Court closed its opinion by reiterating that the defendant’s DNA is used only 
for identification, that CODIS did not reveal the genetic traits of the arrestee 
 
 17   Id. at 448. 
 18   Id. (citing Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001)). 
 19   Id. at 449-56. 
 20   Id. at 459. 
 21   King, 569 U.S. at 459-61. 
 22   Id. at 461. 
 23   Id. at 462 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979)). 
 24   Id. 
 25   Id. at 463 (internal quotations omitted). 
 26   Id. at 463. 
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(just his “junk DNA”), and the Court reassured readers of its opinion that the 
Maryland DNA Collection Act guards against further invasions of privacy.27 
King established that arrestees have a more limited scope of privacy 
interests than suspects of crimes, but the Court only saw DNA for its 
productive use in identification, comparing it to categorically different 
information such as photographing or fingerprinting, and thereby failed to 
see its potential for exposing private information.  The Court 
mischaracterized non-coding regions of DNA as “junk DNA” when there is 
in fact sensitive information available in non-coding regions.28  The 
remainder of Part II will discuss the potential risks associated with the 
exposure of sensitive genetic information, but it is necessary to understand 
how the Supreme Court’s characterization of genetic information has set the 
foundation for the current lack of protection in DNA collection and analysis. 
B. What Justifies Law Enforcement Collection of Genetic Information 
from Suspects? 
1. Voluntary Exposure of Genetic Information 
While arrestees have a diminished expectation of privacy, mere 
criminal suspects retain the full body of constitutional protections.29  The 
Fourth Amendment protects against “police efforts to obtain samples directly 
from suspects,” but that prohibition only applies to government action, 
leaving open the possibility that “the police may be able to acquire 
preexisting information from cooperative private hospitals or laboratories 
without a court order and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion.”30  
This would rely on the fact that the individual provided the third party with 
the information, stripping it of its privacy interest, and allowing the 
government to avoid engaging in any search or seizure.31 
This loophole acts as a work-around people’s privacy rights.  What is 
constitutionally protected by the Fourth Amendment relies both on what a 
person’s actual subjective expectation of privacy is, as well as whether that 
expectation is one that society is willing to accept as reasonable.32  In the 
seminal privacy case, Katz v. United States,33 the government acquired 
evidence by attaching a recording device to a phone booth and argued that 
there was no search because there was no physical trespass, and because the 
 
 27   King, 569 U.S. at 464-65. 
 28   See Natalie Ram, DNA by the Entirety, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 881 (2015). 
 29   King, 569 U.S. at 462. 
 30   Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 6, at 425. 
 31   Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 6, at 425. 
 32   Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 33   Id. at 348–49. 
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phone booth was a public place. The Court ruled, and Justice Harlan’s 
concurring opinion further extrapolated, that because the federal agents had 
no warrant authorizing the interception, the search violated the Fourth 
Amendment and warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject to 
some exceptions.34  Justice Harlan explained that “there is a twofold 
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society 
is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”35 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court applied the Katz test in United States 
v. Miller,36 and found that Miller, charged with possessing an unregistered 
still, was evading taxes.37  The bank cooperated with law enforcement by 
surrendering information and records on Miller’s account, and Miller moved 
to suppress the documents on the ground that he made the information 
available to the bank for a “limited purpose.”38  The Court rejected this 
argument on the grounds that Miller had taken the risk to reveal his affairs 
and that he understood they might be conveyed to the government.39  The 
Court noted that “the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of 
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government 
authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will 
be used only for a limited purpose and [that] the confidence placed in the 
third party [would] not be betrayed.”40 
Professor Imwinkelried and Professor Kaye have identified three bases 
to distinguish Miller from cases involving DNA: (1) Miller involved bank 
records concerning commercial transactions, not DNA, which contains 
intimate and private medical information; (2) even if Miller applies to 
medical documents, it probably does not apply to a physical DNA sample 
because the sample represents a greater threat to privacy on account of the 
ability to derive much more—possibly unrelated—private information; and 
(3) where Miller voluntarily conveyed the information to the bank, law 
enforcement’s “voluntary” acquisition of DNA is debatable depending on 
the circumstances.41 
2. “Abandoned” DNA 
DNA may be covertly taken by police by following “a bread-crumb 
 
 34   Id. at 357. 
 35   Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 36   United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). 
 37   Id. at 436; Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 6, at 427. 
 38   Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 6, at 427; Miller, 425 U.S. at 442. 
 39   Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. 
 40   Id. 
 41   Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 6, at 429-31. 
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trail of identifying DNA matter.”42  According to current law and regulation, 
an individual who has “abandoned . . . [genetic] material in a public place, 
retains no reasonable expectation of privacy in it.”43  Currently, 
“[c]onstitutional law offers virtually no protection to suspects who are 
targeted for their abandoned DNA,” and “existing Fourth Amendment law is 
ill-suited to the facts of abandoned DNA collection.”44  As stated above, 
police activity “constitutes a ‘search’ for Fourth Amendment purposes only 
if the person claiming an illegal search exhibits both an actual expectation of 
privacy and one that ‘society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable.”‘“45  
While acquiring a person’s DNA by force would constitute a search, “where 
suspects ‘knowingly expose’ items to public view, the Court has held that 
the collection of such evidence falls outside the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections.”46 
Most people would not think that throwing away a water bottle, 
hairbrush, or toothbrush means you are giving up your right to privacy in 
your DNA, but under the current understanding, that is exactly what it 
means.  Viewing DNA as “abandoned” is untenable because its emission or 
emanation in public places cannot be avoided—and this is true whether it is 
hair, saliva, or any other involuntarily secreted material containing genetic 
information.47  Legal scholars have found that “the Fourth Amendment query 
focuses on the item left behind—usually of no concern to the person 
targeted—rather than the genetic information contained within it,” so, as 
applied, “the Fourth Amendment fails to protect genetic privacy 
adequately.”48  While the Supreme Court has found that garbage may not 
maintain a privacy interest since it has been abandoned and left for 
collection, DNA is clearly different because “one can shred papers or burn 
garbage . . . but leaving DNA in public places cannot be avoided.”49  
Therefore, the analogy of DNA to trash may not be the most productive or 
accurate.  Some have put forth other analogies for DNA, comparing it to 
fingerprints, the body and its organs, or human waste; meanwhile, others 
have advocated for genetic exceptionalism.50  While the Court in King 
 
 42   United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 873 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 43   Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 6, at 437. 
 44   Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth Amendment and 
Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. U.L. REV. 857, 863 (2006). 
 45   Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 46   Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351). 
 47   Id. at 867. 
 48   Id. at 866. 
 49   Id. at 867. 
 50   Joh, supra note 44, at 868–74.  Genetic exceptionalism is the belief that genetic 
information is special and so must be treated differently from other types of medical data or 
other personally identifiable information.   
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compared the use of DNA for identification to the use of fingerprints, this 
comparison is shaky at best.  As Justice Scalia noted in his dissent, “the 
Court’s comparison of Maryland’s DNA searches to other techniques such 
as fingerprinting, can seem apt only to those who know no more than today’s 
opinion chose to tell them about how those DNA searches actually work.”51 
As technology evolves, we are deriving increased information from 
DNA.  As Part II will explain in detail, our previous scientific understanding 
of DNA has changed since King, and ‘junk’ DNA is no longer a term used 
to describe the DNA analyzed for identification because scientist have found 
private information in these parts of DNA.52  Surely, the code that contains 
all of our genetic information—including predispositions to diseases, 
ancestral and racial backgrounds, private medical information, familial 
information, and information still to be deciphered—deserves more 
protection than the pattern found at the tips of our fingers used only for 
identification.  Without further regulation and protection, Americans are 
allowing collection of some of the most sensitive information that exists 
about themselves, and all without a warrant. There is no comparable 
sensitive information that is not thoroughly protected by regulation or well-
established privacy interest. 
3. Familial DNA 
Familial searching generally refers  to looking in a DNA database not 
for the person who left the crime-scene sample, but rather for a relative of 
that person.53  Understanding familial searches from a Fourth Amendment 
perspective is difficult and has not been attempted by the Supreme Court.54  
In King, the Court found that the acquisition of DNA constitutes a separate 
Fourth Amendment event from the analysis of the DNA, and many have 
speculated that the only manageable Fourth Amendment framework is to see 
these two as distinct searches.55  Familial searches “fall between the cracks” 
because “even if the searching violated a right, it is not clear it would be the 
relative’s right (and not the original database lead’s).”56 
A DNA sample “carries sensitive information about [an] individual—
and . . .  about the close relatives of [an] individual.”57  In the context of 
Fourth Amendment searches, “the convicted offender’s diminished privacy 
 
 51   King, 569 U.S. at 466 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 52   Ram, supra note 28, at 881. 
 53   Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 MICH. L. 
REV. 291, 297 (2010). 
 54   Id. at 333. 
 55   Id. at 335; see also Ram, supra note 28, at 896. 
 56   Murphy, supra note 53, at 334–35.   
 57   David H. Kaye, The Genealogy Detectives: A Constitutional Analysis of “Familial 
Searching” 50 AM. L. REV. 109, 137 (2013). 
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cannot in turn diminish the privacy of his or her relatives,” because “the 
relative never ‘assumed a risk.’”58  This would be true whether the original 
DNA came from an arrestee in CODIS or from a non-criminal database.  In 
both scenarios, the third party did not volunteer their DNA, and had no say 
in their family member’s involuntary (or voluntary for genetic databases) 
exposure of shared genetic data. 
Recent cases have brought this issue to the forefront of the genetic 
privacy debate.  In April of 2010, investigators in California used familial 
searching to uncover a potential match in search of the “Grim Sleeper.”59  
Using the information from the search—that came from the killer’s 
convicted son—the police conducted a sting operation, and collected a 
discarded piece of pizza from the suspect’s trash, which was tested and found 
to match the DNA found at the crime scenes.60  The suspect was subsequently 
arrested.61  Those who oppose familial searches of CODIS argue that it serves 
as a form of racial profiling because a higher population of inmates are 
minorities, and this gives the authorities an ability to filter by race and 
disproportionally toward minorities.62  Jeffery Rosen, a law Professor at 
George Washington University, has stated that “the technique is not 
inherently good or evil,” but rather that it has to do with “what crimes it is 
used for, who’s in the database, how the database is regulated and what is 
done with the samples.”63 
Recently, the Golden State Killer was found in California using DNA 
technology and non-governmental DNA databases.64  When the police found 
no matches in CODIS, they uploaded the DNA to a public DNA database 
website called GEDMatch.65  Although GEDMatch discloses that profiles 
could be used to investigate violent crimes, many customers of genealogy 
companies did not realize they would be signing up to help criminal 
investigations.66  The disclosures led to “49 genetic identifications” and the 
 
 58   Murphy, supra note 53, at 336.   
 59   Murphy, supra note 53, at 294. 
 60   Murphy, supra note 53, at 294. 
 61   Jennifer Steinhauer, ‘Grim Sleeper’ Arrest Fans Debate on DNA Use, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 8, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/09/us/09sleeper.html. 
 62   Id. 
 63   Id. 
 64   Gina Kolata & Heather Murphy, The Golden State Killer Is Tracked Through a 
Thicket of DNA, and Experts Shudder, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/27/health/dna-privacy-golden-state-killer-
genealogy.html. 
 65   Id. 
 66   Heather Murphy, Sooner or Later Your Cousin’s DNA Is Going to Solve a Murder, 
N.Y. Times (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/25/us/golden-state-killer-
dna.html. 
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reopening of a number of cold cases.67  An additional 300 cases are in the 
process of being reopened: old murders, serial sexual assaults, and 
unidentified bodies, according to estimates by various genealogists and 
investigators.68  Some believe that the same regulations imposed by states on 
CODIS should also be placed on family genealogy sites.69  As this method is 
being used more and more, Americans are finding out that they have little to 
no recourse to protect their genetic data.70  “In the hands of an advanced 
genealogical sleuth, often all that’s needed to identify someone from a drop 
of saliva, blood, or semen are the DNA profiles of two third cousins.”71  This 
novel method of investigation requires analysis under the lens of the third-
party doctrine of Miller, the DNA privacy interests in King, and a legal 
framework for familial searching in crime solving. 
Genetic information is a powerful tool.  Like any powerful tool, it can 
be used to make the world safer, or it can be used oppressively.  In China, 
the government is using genetic information to track, oppress, detain, and 
control the minority population of Uighurs, a predominantly Muslim ethnic 
group.72  Chinese Officials are saying that a comprehensive DNA database 
could be used to chase down any Uighurs who resist conforming to the 
Chinese campaign of “re-education” meant to make Uighurs more 
subservient to the Communist Party.73  Dr. Kidd, a Yale Professor and a 
major figure in the American genetics field, said he had been “unaware of 
how his material and know-how were being used,” and the scientific 
community is reeling from China’s use of DNA databases.74 
Imagine a world where the police or other government enforcement 
authority has the ability to find out private personal information about you 
by finding pieces of hair you shed, or by finding your saliva on a water bottle 
you discarded.  Imagine a world where private genetic information about 
your predisposition to diseases or your ancestral history can be traced back 
to you, simply by a family member’s decision to submit their own genetic 
information—even from a relative as distant as a third cousin.  Police are not 
supposed to be interested in the personal information—such as health 
information or ancestry—within our DNA, and rather should only use it for 
 
 67   Id. 
 68   Id. 
 69   Id. 
 70   Id. 
 71   Id. (A third cousin is someone who shares a set of your sixteen great-great-great 
grandparents, which might consist of over 800 people). 
 72   Sui-Lee Wee, China Uses DNA to Track Its People, With the Help of American 
Expertise, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/business/china-
xinjiang-uighur-dna-thermo-fisher.html.  
 73   Id. 
 74   Id. 
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purposes of identifying individuals.75  And while the police are only allowed 
to use this information for a limited purpose, genetic information is still 
extremely sensitive and completely immutable, and for that reason police 
should secure a warrant prior to obtaining and/or analyzing DNA.  As some 
of the examples above demonstrate, the use of genetic information is 
evolving alongside our understanding of it.  More safeguards are required to 
maintain the balance of power between the people’s privacy interests and the 
government’s interests in public safety.  While the power of genetic 
information may be used for good, it can also be applied for nefarious 
purposes. 
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF BREACHING GENETIC PRIVACY 
A. Why Protect Genetic Information? 
Upon first glance, some might ask why people should even be 
concerned with the advancement of genetic technology and instead focus 
solely on its beneficial effect on crime solving.  As Justice Scalia points out 
in his dissent in King, when America was still in its infancy, the British 
would use “general warrants,” which were not grounded upon a sworn oath 
of a specific infraction, and therefore were not limited in scope and 
application.76  The Virginia Constitution first addressed general warrants as 
“grievous and oppressive,” and “the Maryland Declaration of Rights 
similarly provided that general warrants were ‘illegal.’”77  Worries about the 
uses of oppressive police powers lead to “Madison’s draft of what became 
the Fourth Amendment.”78  While courts have found that there is a “closely 
guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless [sic] 
searches,” these searches were never meant to serve “the normal need for 
law enforcement.”79  Justice Scalia also made clear that “the legitimacy of 
the Court’s method and the correctness of its outcome hinge entirely on the 
truth of a single proposition: that the primary purpose of these DNA searches 
is something other than simply discovering evidence of criminal 
wrongdoing.”80 
The Court in King attempted to maneuver around this requirement, 
finding that the buccal swab and DNA acquisition was for “identification” 
purposes, but “that seems . . . quite wrong—unless what one means by 
 
 75   Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 464–65 (2013) 
 76   King, 569 U.S. at 466 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 77   Id. at 466–67 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 78   Id. at 467 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 79   Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997); Skinner v. Railway Labor Execs.’ 
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted); King, 569 U.S. at 467-
68 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 80   King, 569 U.S. at 468 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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‘identifying’ someone is ‘searching for evidence that he has committed 
crimes unrelated to the crime of his arrest.’”81  Of course, if identifying 
someone means finding out what unsolved crimes he has committed, then 
“identification is indistinguishable from the ordinary law-enforcement aims 
that have never been thought to justify a suspicionless [sic] search.”82  
Significantly, “King was not identified by his association with the [DNA] 
sample; rather, the sample was identified by its association with King,” 
undermining the majority’s “identification” theory.83  In Justice Scalia’s 
words, “it is safe to say that if the Court’s identification theory is not wrong, 
there is no such thing as error.”84 
To further bolster its identification argument, the Court in King 
compares DNA to taking a person’s photograph or fingerprints.85  The Court, 
however, has never held that a person has an expectation of privacy in a 
photograph, nor that taking fingerprints is a Fourth Amendment search.86  
Unlike DNA, which is used solely to solve crimes, fingerprints are actually 
taken to identify arrestees and fingerprints do not contain the same level of 
information as DNA.87  “Solving unsolved crimes is a noble objective, but it 
occupies a lower place in the American pantheon of noble objectives than 
the protection of our people from suspicionless [sic] law-enforcement 
searches.”88  Justice Scalia closed his dissent by rejecting the idea that “the 
proud men who wrote the charter of our liberties would have been so eager 
to open their mouths for royal inspection.”89 
If we determine that our current understanding of genetic information 
is inadequate, how might we reframe the way the law protects our genetic 
information, or how might we promulgate regulations on the government’s 
access, storage, and use of our personal genetic information? 
B. “Ownership” of DNA 
One possible solution to the issue of shared genetic information is to 
treat shared DNA as protected by a theory similar to tenancy by the entirety.90  
In her article “DNA by the Entirety,” Professor Ram explains two examples 
 
 81   Id. at 469–70 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 82   Id. at 470 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 83   Id. at 474 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 84   Id. at 476 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 85   Id. at 459. 
 86   King, 569 U.S. at 476–77 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 458 (“fingerprinting 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment precisely because it fit within the accepted means of 
processing an arrestee into custody.”). 
 87   Id. at 478 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 88   Id. at 481 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 89   Id. at 482 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 90   Ram, supra note 52, at 877.   
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of familial DNA threatening privacy interests.91  First, a member of the Lacks 
family died from cervical cancer and had their cells used for research 
resulting in the publication of that individual’s genome.92  Second, a man 
suspected of a crime was found by his relation to a family member who had 
also been arrested, and his DNA was “abandoned” and subsequently 
collected, resulting in a positive match and an arrest.93  The three prominent 
areas affected by familial privacy interests in genetic data are forensic 
familial identification, genetic research, and personal genetic testing.94  If 
identifiable genetic information is worthy of protection, “then legal 
institutions must take its inherently shared nature seriously.”95 
Because of the shared nature of DNA, an “individual’s authority to 
control their ‘own’ identifiable genetic information may be affected by how 
the government, research entities, or genetic testing firms make use of 
genetic information drawn from close genetic relatives.”96  Unlike your 
social security number, credit card information, or bank account number, 
“the genetic information an individual inherits from her parents is the genetic 
information she will always have.”97  Given the immutable nature of genetic 
information, once it is exposed without your consent, “nothing can be done 
to sever your connections to that information,” and both the individual and 
their family would have suffered invasions to their genetic privacy.98  In the 
terms of a tenancy by the entirety, “the shared nature of identifiable genetic 
information is not subject to severance,” and therefore deserving of higher 
scrutiny.99 
Furthermore, genetic information is shared non-volitionally.100  This is 
especially relevant in the context of “voluntarily shared” information.  
“Notions of abandonment, which play a key role in both research and 
forensic uses of genetic information . . . turn on some notion of volition—
the ‘knowing exposure’ of material or information to the public.”101 
Some have postulated that “property offers a more advantageous lens 
for addressing shared interests in identifiable genetic information.”102  
Through tenancy by the entirety, the law chooses to perceive two people as 
 
 91   Ram, supra note 28, at 874–75.   
 92   Ram, supra note 52, at 874. 
 93   Ram, supra note 52, at 875.   
 94   Ram, supra note 28, at 876. 
 95   Ram, supra note 28, at 877. 
 96   Ram, supra note 28, at 899.   
 97   Ram, supra note 28, at 903. 
 98   Ram, supra note 28, at 903.   
 99   Ram, supra note 28, at 904. 
 100   Ram, supra note 28, at 904.  
 101   Ram, supra note 28, at 905.   
 102   Ram, supra note 28, at 908.   
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one person at law, so that neither person owns any individual interest in an 
estate, rather it belongs to the couple.103  “Genetic information among closely 
related individuals also exhibits a unity of identity, . . . a biological one.”104  
Certain policy measures already acknowledge the shared nature of genetic 
privacy.  The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) extends 
medical privacy protection to “genetic information,” and defines an 
individual’s genetic data to include information about “the genetic tests of 
family members of such individual.”105  Some solutions, like one practiced 
in Iceland, include requiring the informed consent of family members before 
shared genetic information is exposed.106 
As applied, this property theory of DNA would consider the State’s use 
of DNA in familial searching an encumbrance, and tenancy by the entirety 
forbids encumbrance of shared property without the consent of the other 
partner.107  The encumbrance would spread to any individual whose genetic 
information is exploited by the government’s use.108  As far as “forfeiture” 
of the property is concerned, the shared property is generally still protected, 
as it is owned by the other spouse.109  In other words, “courts should constrain 
the government to using genetic information it has lawfully obtained to 
search for matches implicating the match offender—but not to search for 
matches implicating the matching offender’s close genetic relatives.”110  
Looking for an exact match only implicates the suspected offender’s genetic 
privacy, and therefore does not breach the privacy of the suspect’s close 
family members.111 
C. Privacy as the Main Concern 
Forensic analysis of DNA currently examines “variations in the lengths 
of . . . short tandem repeats (STRs) to construct DNA profiles.”112  STRs 
have medical implications, and can be used to identify inherited degenerative 
neurological disorders that could lead to diseases like dementia.113  These 
forms of genetic variations appear in both coding and non-coding regions of 
 
 103   Ram, supra note 28, at 910.   
 104   Ram, supra note 28, at 911.   
 105   Ram, supra note 28, at 915–16; see also 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–91(d)(16) (2012). 
 106   Ram, supra note 28, at 901. 
 107   Ram, supra note 28, at 920.   
 108   Ram, supra note 28, at 920.   
 109   Ram, supra note 28 at 921–22. 
 110   Ram, supra note 28, at 923.   
 111   Ram, supra note 28, at 923.   
 112   Ram, supra note 28, at 880. 
 113   Ram, supra note 28, at 880; see also Karen Usdin, The Biological Effects of Simple 
Tandem Repeats Lessons From the Repeat Expansion Diseases, 18 GENOME RES. 1011 
(2008). 
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the genome, but the STRs that American forensic labs typically examine are 
those located in non-coding portions of the genome.114  Significantly, new 
research has cast doubt on the notion that non-coding DNA is “junk,” and 
researchers have linked genetic disorders to STRs in non-coding regions of 
genes, suggesting the distinction between coding and non-coding regions are 
less rigid than previously thought.115 
Direct-to-consumer companies like 23andMe distinguish the 
“individual level information” that they supply to customers from the 
“anonymized and aggregated information” that they share or sell to third 
parties.116  “Individual level information” is information about a single 
individual’s genotypes, diseases or traits/characteristics, which they 
“anonymize and aggregate” by stripping the genome of an individual’s name 
and contact information before aggregating the information with others.117  
But recent studies have demonstrated that “anonymization” may not be 
possible.118  Anonymization may not be possible because an individual can 
be uniquely identified with access to just seventy-five single-nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SNPs), while genome-wide association studies routinely 
use more than 100,000 SNPs to genotype individuals.119  Re-identification is 
possible even from pooled or aggregated DNA data and often yields 
information about both the specific individual from whom the genetic 
material came, and her close genetic relatives.120 
Congress has demonstrated an understanding of the importance of 
genetic information through passage of the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA).121  GINA “aims to protect individuals from 
discrimination on the basis of genetic information in the employment and 
health insurance markets.”122  GINA “clarifies that ‘genetic information’ is 
‘health information’ under the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).”123  HIPAA emphasizes the need for 
control “where ‘individually identifiable’ information is at issue.”124  The 
HIPAA definition depends on the “identifiable” nature of the information, 
 
 114   Ram, supra note 28, at 880.   
 115   Ram, supra note 28, at 881. 
 116   Ram, supra note 28, at 886. 
 117   Ram, supra note 28, at 886.  
 118   Ram, supra note 28, at 886; see also Jeantine E. Lunshof et al., From Genetic Privacy 
to Open Consent, 9 NATURE REVS. GENETICS 406, 406 (2008). 
 119   Ram, supra note 28, at 886; Amy L. McGuire & Richard A. Gibbs, No Longer De-
Identified, 312 SCIENCE 370, 370 (2006). 
 120   Ram, supra note 28, at 886–87. 
 121   Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 110 Pub. L. No.  233, 122 Stat. 
881 (2008). 
 122   Ram, supra note 28, at 894. 
 123   Ram, supra note 28, at 895. 
 124   Ram, supra note 28, at 895.   
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so companies anonymize genetic data to be excluded from the definition, but 
as this paper has already established, anonymous data has been re-identified 
and therefore cannot be excluded from the HIPAA definition.125 
As stated earlier in Part II, in King, the Supreme Court recognized that 
“the analysis of identifiable genetic information, and not only its collection, 
calls for constitutional scrutiny—and thus that identifiable genetic 
information is information in which individuals may have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy.”126  While the Court concluded that neither collection 
nor analysis is impermissible under the Fourth Amendment where an 
individual has been validly arrested for a serious crime, it is significant “that 
the Court considered the genetic analysis independently, as it implies that 
genetic analysis itself implicates a privacy interest of constitutional 
magnitude.”127  While the privacy interest in that information will not 
necessarily stop the government from making use of that information 
without authorization, the “existence of that interest demands more 
searching scrutiny where unauthorized or compelled genetic analysis is at 
issue.”128  The differentiating factor in the King decision was the Court’s 
finding of a diminished expectation of privacy based on King’s status as an 
arrestee.129  The Court in King was also under the impression that the 
information it claimed to be using for identification purposes was “junk,” 
while we now know that is not the case—making the comparison to 
fingerprints or photographs inapposite.130  “In sum, policymakers, courts, and 
ordinary citizens agree: enabling individuals to control dissemination of their 
identifiable genetic information—whether in the language of privacy or 
property—is worthy of pursuit.”131 
IV. HOW CARPENTER MIGHT AFFECT THE USE AND COLLECTION OF 
GENETIC INFORMATION 
A. Carpenter and the Third-Party Doctrine 
In Carpenter v. United States,132 the Supreme Court held that: (1) the 
government acquiring an individual’s historical cell-site location 
information (CSLI) from wireless carriers constituted a search under the 
Fourth Amendment, and that the search invaded an individual’s reasonable 
 
 125   Ram, supra note 28, at 895.   
 126   Ram, supra note 28, at 896 (emphasis added).   
 127   Ram, supra note 28, at 896. 
 128   Ram, supra note 28, at 896.  
 129   Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 462 (2013). 
 130   Id. at 442-43. 
 131   Ram, supra note 28, at 897. 
 132   138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
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expectation of privacy in the whole of his movements, despite the fact that 
the government obtained the information from a third party; and (2) a court 
order obtained by the government under the Stored Communications Act 
was not a permissible mechanism for accessing historical CSLI because it 
fell short of probable cause—therefore requiring a warrant.133 
Timothy Carpenter was picked up by police concerning a number of 
robberies that had occurred in the Detroit area.134  The police applied for a 
court order, based on information given by the suspect, to obtain cell phone 
records from Carpenter’s wireless carriers under the Stored Communications 
Act.135  The cell phone records provided the government with 12,898 location 
points cataloguing Carpenter’s movements, averaging out at about 101 per 
day.136  Carpenter challenged the evidence with a motion to suppress the 
CSLI, which he argued was obtained without a warrant supported by 
probable cause, but the district court denied the motion.137  “The Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Carpenter lacked a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the location information . . . because he had shared 
that information with his wireless carriers,” and therefore it was not entitled 
to Fourth Amendment protection.138  The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
and overturned the Sixth Circuit’s decision.139 
Chief Justice Roberts began his legal analysis, echoing Justice Scalia’s 
dissent in King, by recalling the reason for adopting the Fourth Amendment: 
colonial “general warrants” and “writs of assistance.”140  The Court 
acknowledged that, “[f]or much of our history, Fourth Amendment search 
doctrine was tied to common-law trespass and focused on whether the 
Government obtains information by physically intruding on a 
constitutionally protected area,” however, a more recent precedent has 
established that “property rights are not the sole measure of Fourth 
Amendment violations.”141  This is so because “the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places,” and “when an individual seeks to preserve 
something as private, and his expectation of privacy is one that society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable[,] . . . official intrusion into that private 
sphere generally qualifies as a search and requires a warrant supported by 
probable cause.”142 
 
 133   Id. at 2209–2210.   
 134   Id. at 2212. 
 135   Id. at 2210.  
 136   Id. at 2209.  
 137   Id. at 2212.   
 138   Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2209.   
 139   Id. at 2206. 
 140   Id. at 2213 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 141   Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 142   Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
SOBH(DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/2020  3:55 PM 
646 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 44:3 
While the Court acknowledged that “no single rubric definitively 
resolves which expectations of privacy are entitled to protection,” the Fourth 
Amendment analysis “is informed by historical understandings of what was 
deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when the Fourth Amendment 
was adopted.”143  Roberts then offered some basics guideposts to Fourth 
Amendment law, such as the “privacies of life against arbitrary power,” and 
he explained that “the central aim of the Framers was to place obstacles in 
the way of a too permeating police surveillance.”144 
In accounting for how the Fourth Amendment could apply to advanced 
technology, the Court explained that technology has enhanced the 
government’s capacity to encroach upon areas normally guarded from 
inquisitive eyes.145  The Court explained its responsibility to “assure 
preservation of [the] degree of privacy against government that existed when 
the Fourth Amendment was adopted,” but continue to adapt with technology 
“[b]ecause any other conclusion would leave [people] at the mercy of 
advancing technology.”146 
The difficulty in Carpenter was classifying the privacy interest 
maintained by the defendant, and making it fit with one line of cases defining 
location tracking and another line of cases concerning information offered to 
a third party.147  In the first line of cases, the Court found that a person has a 
protectable privacy interest in the constant tracking of his location, because 
it is qualitatively different  and more personal than other types of 
information.148  In the second line of cases, the Court has held that “a person 
has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns 
over to third parties,” even if “the information is revealed on the assumption 
that it will be used for a limited purpose.”149 
The “third-party doctrine” traces its roots to Miller, mentioned earlier 
regarding the government’s acquisition of defendant’s financial information 
from the bank, and Smith, a case involving phone carriers divulging 
individuals’ phone numbers to the government.150  In Carpenter, the Court 
differentiated Miller and Smith, by acknowledging that “while the third-party 
doctrine applies to telephone numbers and bank records, it is not clear 
whether its logic extends to the qualitatively different category of cell-site 
 
 143   Id. at 2213–14. 
 144   Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214.  
 145   Id. 
 146   Id. 
 147   Id. at 2215–16. 
 148   Id. at 2215. 
 149   Id. at 2216 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 150   See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); Miller, 425 U.S. at 437.   
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records.”151  At the time of Smith, no one imagined a society where a phone 
goes wherever its owner goes and conveys information not only regarding 
who the owner speaks to, but also where the owner travels.152  The Court 
refused to apply Smith and Miller to Carpenter because of the “unique nature 
of cell phone location records,” and because a person “maintains a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured 
through CLSI.”153  Therefore, the fact that the information is held by a third 
party “does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth Amendment 
protection;” and “the location information obtained from Carpenter’s 
wireless carriers was the product of a search” and required a warrant.154 
Furthermore, the Court explained that “[a] person does not surrender 
all Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere[,] . . . 
what one seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, 
may be constitutionally protected.”155  Society’s expectation is that the 
government would not, and could not, monitor a person’s every movement; 
allowing the government access to CLSI would contravene that 
expectation.156  These location records “hold for many Americans the 
privacies of life,” because a cell phone is “almost a feature of human 
anatomy.”157  The retrospective quality of the data also gives police access 
to a category of information otherwise unknowable.158  With access to CLSI 
the government can “travel back in time to retrace a person’s whereabouts, 
subject only to the retention policies of the wireless carriers,” and the police 
“need not even need know in advance whether they want to follow a 
particular individual or when.”159 
On the third-party doctrine, the Court rejected the government’s 
argument that the information was void of privacy interest solely because it 
was a “business record” and was in the hands of a third party.160  There is a 
world of difference between the steady location tracking of an individual and 
his bank records or phone number.161  The Court held the “third-party 
doctrine stems from the notion that an individual has a reduced expectation 
of privacy in information” shared with another, but “diminished privacy 
interests does not mean that the Fourth Amendment falls out of the picture 
 
 151   Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216–17 (emphasis added). 
 152   Id. 
 153   Id. at 2217. 
 154   Id. 
 155   Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967)). 
 156   Id. 
 157   Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 158   Id. 
 159   Id. 
 160   Id. at 2219. 
 161   Id. 
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entirely.”162  Because the third-party doctrine cannot be mechanically 
applied, the Court in Carpenter found there are no comparable limitations 
(as in Miller and Smith) on the revealing nature of CLSI (hence a finding that 
it is “qualitatively different”).163 
The second issue with the government’s third-party doctrine argument 
was “voluntary exposure.”164  The Court rejected this argument because 
CLSI is not voluntarily “shared” as that term is understood in the third-party 
doctrine context.165  Just by using a phone, “[i]n no meaningful sense does 
the user voluntarily assume the risk of turning over a comprehensive dossier 
of his physical movements.”166  With that, the Court distinguishes Carpenter 
from Smith and Miller, and finds that the fact that the Government obtained 
the information from a third party does not overcome Carpenter’s claim to 
Fourth Amendment protection.167 
To be clear, the Supreme Court clarified that “its decision . . . is a 
narrow one,” and does not “express a view on matters not before [it].”168  It, 
however, reaffirms the proposition that the ultimate measure of the 
constitutionality of a governmental search is reasonableness, and warrantless 
searches are per se unreasonable (with some exceptions).169  “This is 
certainly not to say that all orders compelling the production of documents 
will require a showing of probable cause[,] . . . only that a warrant is required 
in the rare case where the suspect has a legitimate privacy interest in records 
held by a third party.”170  Thus, due to the fact that “CLSI is an entirely 
different species of business record” and since location information 
maintains a privacy interest, the Court opined that “[b]efore compelling a 
wireless carrier to turn over a subscriber’s CSLI, the Government’s 
obligation is a familiar one—get a warrant.”171 
B. The Protection of Genetic Information 
While Carpenter dealt with a different type of protectable private 
information, its reasoning, result, and guidance can inform decisions on how 
to better regulate the use of genetic data in crime-solving.  The rationale used 
to address many of the issues discussed in Carpenter is nearly identical to 
this comment’s proposed regulation of issues exposed by law enforcement 
 
 162   Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 163   Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219. 
 164   Id. at 2220. 
 165   Id. 
 166   Id. at 2220 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979)). 
 167   Id. at 2220. 
 168   Id. 
 169   Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221. 
 170   Id. 
 171   Id. at 2221–22. 
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acquiring individuals’ genetic information.  These two issues are: (1) 
whether genetic information taken from arrestees for “identification” is still 
valid after debunking the innocence of “junk” DNA (therefore defining it as 
qualitatively different or exceptional); and (2) whether the warrantless 
collection of DNA is reasonable where it is involuntarily abandoned, 
voluntarily exposed, or discovered through family ties.  This issue deserves 
more scrutiny after Carpenter decided that certain information deserves a 
level of exceptionalism due to its degree of sensitivity.172 
The Court in King considered the buccal swab of an arrestee a separate 
search from the analysis of that swab, meaning both must be reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment.173  Originally, the Court believed that only 
“junk DNA” was being used and that it was only used to identify the arrestee 
as the subject of the crime.174  However, as the Court pointed out in 
Carpenter, and Justice Scalia identified in his dissent in King, certain 
evidence is qualitatively different.  Just as Carpenter held that CSLI is 
qualitatively different than simply following someone around because 
tracking someone at every moment might reveal private information, 
collecting and then analyzing DNA from arrestees is qualitatively different 
than fingerprinting or photographing them because of the potential of 
revealing deeply personal information. 
Furthermore, the Court in King conducted a balancing test between the 
interests of law enforcement officials and the interests of arrestees, and found 
that the physical intrusion of the arrestees was minimal, and the use of DNA 
was said to be harmless because it allegedly did not reveal genetic 
information.175  Even though the physical buccal swab is a minimal intrusion, 
if the non-coding regions of DNA do expose personal genetic information, 
then the Court might need to revisit its balancing test with that in mind.  The 
fact that experts have found personal genetic information in non-coding 
regions means that those areas of DNA need protection too, and as stated 
earlier in this comment, anonymization and aggregation of data is also not a 
guarantee against re-identification of a person with the data. 
Where law enforcement officials collect genetic information from 
individuals who are not arrestees, but instead only suspects, police may 
acquire genetic information that is voluntarily exposed, involuntarily 
abandoned, or shared by family members.  Each method presents problems 
of its own.  First, genetic information that is voluntarily exposed is quite 
similar to that of an individual who voluntarily shares her location with a 
cell-service provider.  Similar to individuals having their location tracked by 
 
 172   Id. at 2219. 
 173   Murphy, supra note 53, at 297. 
 174   Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 442–43 (2013).   
 175   Id. 
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consequence of using a phone, individuals who seek to benefit from 
genealogy websites’ services—whether related to discovering private health 
information or information about one’s ancestry—share the information 
within their DNA with these companies and allow those companies to retain 
that information as a consequence of the service they provide.  Genetic 
information would also deserve protection under Katz, because people 
generally have a subjective expectation of privacy in their genetic material, 
and that expectation is one that society is willing to recognize since both 
HIPAA and GINA identify and protect such information.176  Unlike Miller, 
where financial information was voluntarily shared with a bank, genetic 
information has more serious implications because of the sensitivity of the 
information, the information’s more covert but revealing nature, and the fact 
that the information is more analogous to the Court’s reasoning in 
Carpenter—that some types of information deserve a higher standard of 
protection. 
Second, while law enforcement officials often treat DNA naturally left 
behind by suspects as “discarded,” this is an inappropriate means of 
describing DNA.  The Court in King defined the physical intrusion of 
retrieving DNA from arrestees as a separate search from the DNA analysis, 
so under this proposed framework even DNA that is involuntarily 
“abandoned” should require a second independent search warrant before it 
can be analyzed.177  Where DNA is voluntarily shared with a third party, a 
court would look to the Miller Third-Party Doctrine, Katz’s expectation of 
privacy, and Carpenter; but where genetic information is involuntarily shed 
from the body, a court must consider whether or not it is fair to identify that 
information as “abandoned.”  In Carpenter, the Court pointed out that the 
cell-phone’s connection to a cell tower created the location information 
rather than the phone actively and purposely sharing its location with the 
carrier.178  In other words, the location tracking was only a product of cell 
usage and so it was not clear that it was voluntarily shared, but rather 
compulsory.  DNA is also compulsorily shared and dropped in the process 
of everyday life, and unlike with cellphones, we cannot account for such 
involuntary sharing of our information.  People do not expect strangers to 
collect and analyze their DNA as they might with discarded “trash,” and so 
genetic information is qualitatively different than other types of expectations 
of privacy, and the analogy of “abandoned” DNA to trash is inappropriate. 
Third, the shared aspect of DNA further complicates the analysis, 
because the acquisition of one individual’s DNA implicates others’ privacy 
interests, and the law should account for DNA’s inherently shared nature.  In 
 
 176   Ram, supra note 28, at 895. 
 177   Murphy, supra note 53, at 297. 
 178   Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
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Carpenter, the Court was uneasy about the idea that the government could 
acquire a detailed dossier of one’s every move for months, and called this 
information “of a unique nature” requiring a warrant.179  Imagine if the police 
had access to not only the suspect’s private location information, but also all 
of their close relatives.  Surely this would have called for further protection, 
but the nature of technology allows for phones to be tracked individually and 
one phone does not necessarily implicate another.  This is not the case with 
DNA, where one person’s genetic code is shared—to varying degrees—with 
many people.  The exposure of one person’s DNA is not only private to the 
person who it came from, but also to family members.  The inherently shared 
nature of DNA is extremely valuable to law enforcement because in some 
scenarios it may help solve an otherwise unsolvable cold case.  Like the 
Golden State Killer, other criminals might be subsequently caught or 
captured using this technology, and this technology’s usefulness should not 
be downplayed.  Instead, if familial searching is something society deems 
appropriate, the State and Federal legislatures should draft legislation and 
dedicate the means to ensure it is done in accordance with the Fourth 
Amendment.  China has revealed to the world what it looks like for a 
powerful police state to abuse genetic technology in order to oppress a 
minority, and while the Constitution protects against many misuses of 
government power, it is the Legislature’s responsibility to regulate the 
Executives enforcement and investigative powers.  While familial searching 
has its utility, genetic information is exceptionally private, immutable, and 
pervasive, and it must be protected as such. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
DNA is unlike any other kind of personal information.  Never before 
has one piece of information had the capability to reveal such detailed 
information about a person.  From private health information, to genetic trait 
propensities, to relatives and ancestry, it would be irrational to give less 
protection to all the information within our genes than we do to all the 
information within our cell phones.  In an age where police can acquire DNA 
consensually, covertly, or through familial ties, it is imperative that Fourth 
Amendment law, as well as State and Federal regulations, adapt to advancing 
technology, and act to protect Americans’ privacy interests in genetic 
information. 
 
 
 179   Id. at 2217. 
